Reference no: EM132633180
1. Describe the resource disparity between the Department of State and the Department of Defense. What challenges and limitations does this disparity pose for the conduct of diplomacy?
2. What should the State Department adopt as priorities for additional resources? Do you believe that the State Department should have a deployable, operational capability to respond to crises?
3. Who is trying to change the way the Department of State does business and why? What are the issues that drive the need for change? What capabilities do the State Department lack that would add to its effectiveness and efficiency?
4. Are the external recommendations for change consistent with the QDDR and statements from the Secretaries of State? How will the proposed changes address and resolve the issues?
5. How is the concept of diplomacy changing at the State Department? Can the State Department anticipate/create and respond to changes in the international environment and the conduct of diplomacy?
6. Do the varying views between and within the Executive Branch and the Legislature enhance or detract from US diplomatic efforts? What other organizations or institutions have an impact on diplomacy?
7. How do economic issues differ from security issues with respect to the conduct of diplomacy? What are/were the issues between the three negotiating partners in achieving the NAFTA?
8. How do the different perspectives between Congress and the Executive Branch affect the outcome of these types of negotiations? Do the key leaders in the overall negotiations necessarily see the priorities, benefits and costs from the same perspective as their counterparts? Why or why not? Who balances those priorities and interests?
9. Why do diplomats and practitioners think economic sanctions are a viable method of enticing or coercing compliance with human rights values or international law/opinion? Are sanctions effective in this context? What do you think a vulnerability assessment would show about South African vulnerability to sanctions?
10. What are the goals of US policy and North Korean/Iranian policy in security and economic issue areas? How have economic sanctions affected the North Korean/Iranian nuclear program? What do you think a vulnerability assessment would show about North Korean/Iranian vulnerability to sanctions? How do the different perspectives between Congress and the Executive branch affect the employment of sanctions?
11. What was the rationale for deploying INF to Europe in the early 1980s? Explain the contextual issues of geography and strategic calculations that tended to divide the alliance on this issue? How did the U.S. get NATO allies to agree to the deployment? How did the process of deployment and the process of negotiation interact?
12. How did the US and Russia interpret the context surrounding the effort to extend NATO membership to former Warsaw Pact countries? How did these perceptions influence the determination of pros and cons of extending NATO membership for both sides of the issue? What did NATO do, if anything, to reassure Russia?
13. How did the US come to lead the effort to quell the sectarian and ethnic violence in the Balkans in the mid-90s? How did the sequencing of military and diplomatic initiatives affect the outcome in the negotiations in Dayton? Do you think the same sort of process would yield similar results in other cases of sectarian/ethnic violence, such as in Syria or Afghanistan? [Week continues on the next page.] 15 INTA 603 American Diplomacy / Summer 2017 Syllabus
14. What did President Clinton articulate as the US role in supporting these negotiations? What were the US, PLA/PA, and Israeli reasons for entering into this negotiating session? What were the "redlines" or nonnegotiable limits of the PLA and Israel? Why did the participants fail to reach an agreement? How did the process of negotiations and the setting contribute to the outcome? What tools (incentives and sanctions) were/are available to the US to influence the two primary actors?