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By using your own words, decribe THREE (3) software that used by Smarter Analytics.
Write down this game's coalitional function.- Compute the bargaining set of this game relative to the coalitional structure {N}.
Construct a belief space in which the described situation is represented by a state of the world and indicate that state.- What is the minimal belief subspace of each of the three players.
For each of the given partitions of a two-dimensional simplex, determine whether or not it is a simplicial partition. Justify your answer.
Find all Nash equilibria in pure strategies in the following non-zero-sum games. Describe the steps that you used in finding the equilibria.
Given a strategic-form game G = (N , (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ), write out a linear program whose set of solution vectors is the set of correlated equilibria of the game.
Construct the normal form of game assuming consumers move simultaneously and choose between two strategies: "Adopt" or "Don't Adopt." Solve for any (pure strategy) Nash equilibria.
Write down the matrix with payoffs for both players - what is the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies - What is the probability that this person is from ethnicity γ? Provide your answer in fractions and not in decimal places. Failure to do so will ..
Find a two-player coalitional game (N; v), and a closed and unbounded set K, such that the nucleolus N (N; v; K) is the empty set.
An injection molding machine produces golf tees that are 20.0% nonconforming. Using the normal distribution as an approximation to the binomial, find the probability that, in a random sample of 360 golf tees, 65 or less are nonconforming. Show you..
What is the smallest value of T for which it possible for B and b to be played in the first play of the game, in a subgame perfect equilibrium
Consider a two-player game and suppose that s* and t* are Nash equilibrium strategy profiles in the game.- Must it be the case that {s1*, t1*} * {s2*, t2*} is a weakly congruous strategy set? Explain why or why not.
Find linear utility functions for the two players representing the preference relations of the players over the possible outcomes.
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