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Consider another version of the lobbying game introduced in this chapter. Suppose the payoffs are the same as presented earlier, except in the case in which firm X lobbies and firm Y does not lobby. In this case, suppose the government's decision yields x to firm X and zero to firm Y. Assume that x > 25. The normal form of this game is pictured here.
a) Designate the (pure-strategy) Nash equilibria of this game (if it has any).
(b) Compute the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the game.
(c) Given the mixed-strategy equilibrium computed in part (b), what is the probability that the government makes a decision that favors firm X? (It is the probability that (L, N) occurs.)
(d) As x rises, does the probability that the government makes a decision favoring firm X rise or fall? Is this good from an economic standpoint?
Do you think farmers collected more or less hay once this law was established and do you think Iceland's prosperity improved because of good neighbors?
In order to answer the following questions, first draw a density curve describing this distribution. Pay attention to the height of the curve!
How many female offspring does a normal organism produce? How many male offspring? Use your answers to ?nd the number of grandchildren born to each mutant and to each normal organism.
Assume zero production cost for both firms. Find the Bertrand equilibrium prices for a simultaneous-move game. Draw the two demand curves in a graph, with price on the vertical axis and demand on the horizontal axis.
Write the matrix representing the induced game and determine whether (I, I) can be enforced. Explain your answer.
In a Gallop poll of 1012 randomly selected adults, 9% said that cloning of humans should be allowed. We are going to use a .05 significance level to test the claim that less than 10% of all adults say that cloning of humans should be allowed. The ..
Draw the table for this game. What are the Nash equilibria in pure strategies? Can one of the equilibria be a focal point? Which one? Why?
Consider now an evolutionary game where what evolves are not strategies in a one-shot game but strategies in a repeated game without discounting
Develop a program that prompts the user to guess the outcome of a die throw. Then throw a die (using a random number generator) and inform the user if they guessed the correct outcome
Is this preference relation rational in the sense defined by the preference theory - Is this preference relation rational in the sense defined by the expected utility theory?
Burger Doodle is a fast-food restaurant that processes an average of 680 food orders each day. The average cost of each order is $6.15. Four percent of the orders are incorrect, and only 10% of the defective orders can be corrected
Assume two competitors every face important strategic decisions where payoff to each decision depends upon reactions of the competitor. Company A can select either row in the payoff matrix defined below,
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