Reference no: EM132206545
Question: A monopolist has 3 different types of customers, types H, M and L with demands given by qH = 18pq M = 14 p qL = 10p. Assume that there are 2 persons of type L, and one person of type M and type H each.
The marginal cost of production is $2 and is equal to the average cost of production.
(a) What is the profit maximizing quantity-tariff bundle if only one is offered for all consumers?
(b) What is the profit maximizing two-part tariff (non-linear pricing) if one two-part tariff is offered to all customers?
(c) What two-part tariffs (non-linear pricing) will the firm offer if it can exercise third degree price discrimination?
(d) Suppose the monopolist wants to create two quantity-tariff bundles, (qA, tA) and (qB, tB) where the A bundle is targeted to both type H and M consumers, while the B bundle is targeted towards L-type customers. Calculate the profit maximizing bundles (qA*, tA*) and (qB*, tB*) when types are unverifiable (incentive compatible bundles)
(e) What are the three profit maximizing bundles if it offers a different one for each type?