Reference no: EM132633177

1. Select an example of one terrorist group/incident from the readings. Analyze the roots and mobilization to identity in that case. What were the dynamics of radicalization for the individuals joining the group?

2. Is there continuity or inconsistency between the Lords of the Silk Route traditional mobilization/transformation process and that described by Shultz for 4th wave terrorist groups? Which description best outlines the transformation to collective violence?

3. Compare and contrast the organizational transformation process presented in the previous lessons with the process of individual recruitment and radicalization outlined here. What are the primary synergies between the two? How is social media influencing the process? 

4. Analyze the roles that narrative can play across each of the stages in the radicalization process. Is there a difference between narrative in native nation radicalization and in the process in western diaspora communities? Is on-line narrative the new draw?

5. Evaluate the role of ideology in building and sustaining terrorist organizations. How has this changed in the transition from 3rd wave ethno-nationalist terrorism to 4th wave religion-based terrorism?

6. Craft an argument either for or against Shultz assertion that the primary focus of terrorist leadership must be on ideology and organization. Explain your position. How does this fit a networked group?

7. Select three core elements that are common to most/all of the presented analytical frameworks, and apply them to your selected group. Does this analysis get at the heart of that group and its particular dynamics?

8. While the RAND (Rabasa) reading does not provide data on all of the relevant elements of LeT for a complete case analysis, back-map from the event to infer what strategic objectives the group is seeking, and project forward to identify the multiple messages and audiences that the Mumbai attack was intended to convey. Did this attack meet its objectives and audiences?

9. Analyze how secular and religious groups end. How do you explain the differences? What are the implications for designing strategic goals and tools for the United States today?

10. Is Al Qa'ida "defeated" today? Would Cronin agree with your assessment? Does this inform the fight against ISIL?

11. Can terrorism be deterred in whole or in part? How would you implement a deterrent strategy with your group?

12. What coercive mechanisms can be applied in the fight against al Qa'ida today? Against ISIL?

13. Evaluate the 2015 Strategy to Defeat ISIL. How does it need to be amended and why?

14. Does the contemporary international system support or constrain efforts to coordinate broad international strategies to combat terrorism and political violence?