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Prove that in a symmetric sealed-bid second-price auction with independent private values the only monotonically increasing, symmetric equilibrium is the equilibrium in which every buyer submits a bid equal to his private value.
Calculate the reliability over a 37 hour period and what is the steady state availability of the system.
Little Kona is a small coffee corporation that is planning entering a market dominated through Big Brew. Each corporation's profit depends on whether Little Kona enters and whether Big Brew sets a high price or a low price.
Each player in any given match can condition her action on whether she was the ?rst to suggest getting together. Assume that for any given player the probability of being the ?rst is one half. Find the ESSs of this game.
Determine the solution to the given advertising decision game between Coke and Pepsi, assuming the companies act independently.
Find a Nash equilibrium that is not a subgame perfect equilibrium, and explain why it fails to be a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Show that the game has an ESS that assigns positive probability only to the demands 2 and 8 and also has an ESS that assigns positive probability only to the demands 4 and 6.
Find all mixed-strategy Nash equilibria and solve for all Nash equilibria and provide a justification for players' preferences over each of these equilibria.
PSC/ECO 288 Game Theory Assignment. Is war avoidable in equilibrium? Draw a graph with c on the horizontal axis and s on the vertical axis, indicating the region where various offers prevail. What is the two countries' payoff from equilibrium in e..
Find a mixed strategy of Player I that guarantees him the same payoff against any pure strategy of Player II.- Find a mixed strategy of Player II that guarantees him the same payoff against any pure strategy of Player I.
Describe this situation as an extensive-form game, where the root of the game tree is a chance move that determines whether Caesar is brave or cowardly.
Assume that a population is normally distributed with a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15. Would it be unusual for the mean of a sample of 3 to be 115 or more? Why or why not?
Evaluate costs factors influencing the company's decision. Determine strategies that would provide value to the outcome your company is seeking relating to this decision.
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