"observe that an array of unique aspects and capabilities of the organization shows aconsiderable possibility of besetting the U.S. counterterrorism policies as well as its coalitionpartners.For instance, ISIS operates within the context of civil wars and has conflated thesewars by obliterating most of the border regions that separate these two countries. Essentially,military operations that occur within the context of interlacing civil wars – as in the case of ISISin Syria and Iraq – are most likely to be oppressed by unparalleled measures of complexity.Secondly, recent scholarship on the ISIS threat and the ongoing war on terrorparticularly in Iraq and Syria suggest that the threat in the region precipitates from a morecomplex political crusade that the military strategy alone cannot upset (Arreguin-Toft 2001,102). Thirdly, the Council on Foreign Relations observes that the U.S.-led counterterrorismcoalition in the Middle East does not just face a threat from the Islamic State, but from aproliferation of unpredictable jihadist groups that operate through shifting coalitions.Notably, Lahoud and Collins observe that the U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Syria isconsiderably „vague? and tends to be confined to the use of air power. However, in agreementwith the assertion of Weinberg and Cockburn (2014), the secular opposition groups supportedby the United States are considerably weak and disunited and are unlikely to provide asufficient ground force to augment the air operations of the U.S.-led coalition.Policy Efficiency and ChallengesThere is a considerable degree of deviation amongst researchers on the efficiency ofcounterterrorism policies against the progress of ISIS. Some argue that the coalition forces haveachieved a considerable gain in suppressing the Islamic State and that there are possibilities of apermanent defeat the group becomes more vulnerable and under pressure from coalition forces(Rogers 2016). However, some analysts contend this argument with the supposition that the12 reduction in the activity of ISIS could indicate that it is merely under hibernation, reviewing itsodds and reorganizing itself to withstand the coalition efforts (Blanchard and Humud 2016).This strategy of hibernation and self-reorganization resonates with the preceding theories ofwhy small nations or groups win wars, the pioneering work of leading researchers such asAndrew (1975) and Arreguin-Toftv (2001). Therefore, to such analysts and academicians, thewar on ISIS is too far from over. Similarly, the current state of the literature converges at theconclusion that there are considerable policy challenges for the US-led coalition in the MiddleEast region (Abrahms 2008, 89; Braithwaite and Johnson 2012, 45; Ashour 2015, 18).As Ingram notes, proponents of the current foreign policy and counterterrorism policiesagainst ISIS argue that the ability of ISIS to preserve its hold on critical regions and to appeal toits global audience has been considerably threatened in the wake of the intensified militaryactivity from coalition forces. However, the generalizability of this assertion is subject to greatcontention, especially in regards to the preceding observation by leading scholars such asAbadie (2006) and Pape (2003). This group of scholars argued that military or politicalachievements might not necessarily be the domineering motivational factor of Islamist terroristgroups, but the dire quest for carnage, recognition, and attention.To proponents such as Ashour, the counterterrorism effort in Iraq and Syria has madesome considerable progress in upsetting the dominance of ISIS in the region. Recent researchand policy analysis reports show that the intensified air campaigns and military presence in theregion have led to a reduction in the use of conventional military campaigns by the group.Similarly, the intensified coalition efforts have reduced both space and time required by thegroup to resource and build its capacities, creating an ample window of opportunity for buildingand implementing a political compromise (Dhiman 2015; Dar 2016, 426).13 On the other hand, critics argue that irrespective of the intensified coalition efforts andmilitary expenditure in the region, ISIS continues to use sophisticated strategies to maneuverthese efforts. Over time, the organization has evolved into a rather highly adaptive and capableinsurgency network in undermining the political and policy interests of the West and Russiabeyond the battlefield and in appealing to many of the political Islamist insurgency networksbeyond the Levant (Rogers 2016). These critics argue that the change of strategy by ISIS doesnot indicate an outright victory of coalition efforts, but a strategic transformation and adaptationfor greater suppleness and survival in the territories it already occupies. O?Connor (2016)argues that ISIS continues to appeal to its global audience and can accomplish most of its globalgoals amidst the increased pressure. From the mainstream literature, the group may adapt to thegrowing pressure from coalition forces by fostering a main stronghold in other areas such asLibya and Europe – through lone wolf terror networks – and by working more closely to fosterits ties with other rebel groups and Islamic crusades in other East Africa, West Africa, andSouth Asia (Rogers 2016). Apart from the aforementioned external challenges to counterterrorism efforts in Syriaand Iraq, the U.S. coalition faces a difficult organizational task, especially owing to themultiagency involvement in the ongoing efforts in the region. Adding to the problem ofdisrupting the progress and upsetting the capabilities of ISIS within the context of two distincttheaters of warfare, managing the collaboration of more than 60 states involved in thecounterterrorism effort in Syria and Iraq will only become progressively unwieldy with time(Ashour 2015, 17; Blanchard and Humud 2016, 23; Mobley 2013, 15). Even though just ahandful of these states are actively involved in the coalition campaigns, collaboration will benaturally complex and challenging as the political interest between the West, Arab, and non- 14 Arab nations begin to diverge. ConclusionThere has been a dramatic increase in scholarship on terrorism and related issues sincethe 9/11 event. Nonetheless, this is not surprising since 9/11 saw the most devastating terroristattack in history, an attack that paved the way for even bloodier warfare as part of the resultingwar on terror. Over time, terrorism has become the defining theme of international politics sincethe first decade of the 21st Century.Indeed, it would be astonishing if such eminence were notcomplemented with a considerable growth in the research interest in this area. This does notimply, however, that the scholarly work before was sparse, but rather to stress the steep amountof scholarly material now being published on the subject today. However, the exact scale of thenew literature on terrorism and ISIS is quite difficult to grasp.Even though terrorism, in general, has been a key subject in the research domain, theresearch interest in the ISIS phenomenon has grown over the past two years following theproclamation of the Islamic State or Caliphate under the rule of a Caliph (Lahoud and Collins2016). However, the mainstream literature on the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies andthe performance of U.S. foreign policies in the Middle East is rather insufficient, as mostresearchers and analyses that focus on terrorism tend to concentrate on the historical progress ofthe terrorist group, its activities in the Middle East region, and its core competencies.While the current body of the literature on terrorism diverges in some respects includingthe very definition of terrorism and the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies in solving theISIS phenomenon (Weinberg 2014; Pollard, Poplack and Casey 2015), there is a considerablepoint of convergence in the current literature. Researchers and analysts tend to agree on the factthat the Islamic State is a high-risk threat to global peace and national security interests of15 "